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1. Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on the effects economic integration of migrants have on the economy of host countries. 
The report focuses on advanced countries that host economic migrants from Low- and Middle-
income Countries (LMICs). Important conclusions from research on other type of host countries 
have been included at some points. In most cases, aggregated data does not make a clear 
distinction between countries of origin, nor does the literature distinguish regular from irregular 
migration.1  
Evidence suggests that international migration can boost aggregate income (GDP growth) in 
high-income host countries over the long term. One of the channels for growth is by expanding 
the labour force and higher wages as international migration can boost capital accumulation for 
migrants and natives. Another channel is that migrants increase the employment-to-population 
ratio in host countries, which is particularly important for countries with aging populations. 
Furthermore, migrants boost capital accumulation and employment through higher foreign 
investments, international trade and entrepreneurship. Finally, international migrants have a 
positive effect on aggregate income in high-income countries as they foster labour productivity, 
boost innovation and complementarities with native workers by increasing diversity in productive 
skills, leading to economic growth.  
A detailed look at the literature on the effects of international migration on wages and labour 
markets shows that in principle migrants have a positive impact on wages and labour market 
dynamics. If migrants’ skills complement those of existing workers, the impact is positive. Only 
when international migrants have similar skills to those of existing workers they could affect 
negatively employment and wages in the short term. Although existing workers in low skilled 
occupations are expected to face more competition from migrants, because the skills needed for 
those jobs are easier to acquire and are less specialised, the literature makes clear that in most 
cases international immigration had a positive effect on the average wages of less educated 
workers. The inflow of low-skilled migrants encouraged natives to upgrade their skills, taking 
advantage of immigrant-native complementarity to spur mobility and increase specialisation into 
more complex jobs, where they became more productive. Less educated existing workers 
experienced particularly large wage and employment gains in countries whose immigration 
systems favour educated immigrants, like Australia and Canada.  
The literature also shows that international immigration has a positive impact on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and international trade. Like with labour markets, the effects are most 
positive when there are complementarities, because immigrants lower the transaction costs for 
trade and investment because of their superior knowledge of home country markets, language, 
customs, business practices, and laws. Hence, the networks of international migration and 
bilateral FDI and trade are strongly and positively correlated, in particular with developing 
countries, where firms typically need to navigate a myriad of bureaucratic and legal hurdles. In 
particular, trade in services, since providing a service abroad often requires an understanding of 
cultural specificities that goes well beyond what is required when selling a physical good abroad.  
                                                   
1 It may be assumed that the literature on economic impact of migration mainly refers to regular migration, as most data and 
statistics are available for these immigrants (including refugees). 
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A debate among scholars has emerged on the question how entrepreneurial migrants are. 
Data from the US and China shows that international migrants are more likely to start their own 
enterprise (in partnership or self-employed). However, other scholars do not find the same 
evidence in European countries. Furthermore, self-employment is often the result of 
discrimination and xenophobia amongst migrants. When they have a choice, migrants may often 
prefer wage employment to being self-employed. Therefore, migrant entrepreneurs may be very 
vulnerable to external shocks because they are often in entrepreneurship due to a lack in access 
to wage employment. 
Although the literature is positive on the employment and labour productivity effects of 
international migration, the literature shows that a large entry of low-skilled immigrants over a 
long period, could change the sectoral specialisation of the economy, for instance toward lower-
productivity sectors such as construction. Furthermore, migrants working in less productive 
sectors could cushion for necessary rapid economic transformation towards more competitive 
capital-intensive sectors. However, an overrepresentation of low-skilled migrants in low 
productivity sectors, without efforts and policy to integrate migrants in higher productive labour 
markets, could result in higher unemployment rates for migrants over time.  
Thus, given their impact on the working-age population and economic activity, migrants can 
generate additional tax revenues and social contributions. However, for some migrants time is 
an important factor, which means for some there will be a delay before they begin making a fiscal 
contribution. In certain circumstances, others contribute in the short-term and medium-term 
through employment, but could lose out of competitive labour markets and may need recourse to 
welfare services and claim social benefits, health care and social assistance. These fiscal effects 
could be mitigated if migration increases the labour productivity, wages, and income from capital 
(e.g. through higher house prices) for natives. Overall, the literature concludes that host 
economies need a flexible labour market to adjust to changes and give migrants options to 
integrate faster in the labour market.  
The literature on the economic impact of refugees shows the same effects on wages, 
employment, foreign investment, international trade, entrepreneurship, innovation and labour 
productivity as mentioned above. Evidence reinforces the consensus that the impact of 
immigration on average native-born workers is small and mainly positive, while for low-skilled 
existing workers the influx of refugees does not have detrimental negative effects. However, 
refugees need more time to integrate in host economies and in most cases are not allowed to 
work during an unsettled status. Like for all migrants, complementarities, language skills, 
education and linkages to migrant networks are important factors for the speed of economic 
integration and impact on host countries’ economies. Evidence also shows that even when 
refugees do not participate in the labour force in the first years after arrival, and as a result 
increase fiscal expenditures on the short-term, their impact on the demand side of the economy 
is positive, resulting in higher GDP growth. 
There is far less evidence in the literature on the effects of women migrants on the economy. 
Like other migrants, women migrants’ economic impact depends on their skills and education. 
Evidence shows that low-skilled female immigrants could promote female labour force 
participation of native women by taking housekeeping and childcare jobs. Furthermore, poor 
macroeconomic or labour market conditions upon arrival tend to slow down integration especially 
for female migrants. Hence, challenges for female migrants, low-skilled economic migrants from 
low-and-middle-income-countries and refugees seem to be particularly acute; their economic 
outcomes are in the short term less advanced. 
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2. Impact on wages and employment 
The importance of complementarities 
Research on the impact of international migration on labour markets and wages shows it critically 
depends on the complementarity between the skills of migrants and existing workers, and the 
economic characteristics of the host country (Fry, 2014). The impacts on the labour market also 
differ between the short and long run when the economy and labour demand can adjust to the 
increase in labour supply (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2018). In principle, migrants with skills similar 
to those of existing workers would compete with them in the labour market and affect 
employment and wages, especially in the short term. If migrants’ skills complement those of 
existing workers, the impact could be positive (Aiyar et al., 2016).  
As Ruhs and Vargas-Silva (2018) explained, it is important to distinguish between the effect of 
immigration on the average wage of all workers in the economy, and on the wages of different 
groups of workers along the wage distribution (e.g. low, medium and high-paid workers). “It is 
possible, for example, that immigration leads to a rise in the average wage of all workers, but to a 
fall in the wages of some low-paid workers” (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2018, p.2). Thus, macro-
economically, countries may report earnings, but individually, there can be loss of incomes for 
low-skilled workers in host countries (Manole et al., 2017). 
In the literature, there is a consensus that international migration has little effect on 
employment rates and average wages of existing workers, but that it may have short-term 
impacts in certain labour market segments. Overall, the IMF (2016) showed that international 
migrants could contribute to labour markets through complementarities, which allow for:  
 Existing workers to move into different segments of labour markets, often performing 
more complex tasks that promote skill upgrading and hence foster efficient specialisation;  
 An increase in female labour market participation;  
 More efficient market functioning, with migrants filling up occupations for which existing 
workers are in short supply;  
 Contributions of high-skilled migrants to technological progress;  
 An increase in labour demand, as migrants expand consumer demand in the short-term 
and investment over the medium-term. 
For instance, to elaborate on the point that international migration could increase female labour 
market participation: in countries where labour market participation of highly skilled native women 
tends to be greater (e.g. Germany, Sweden, Netherlands), this correlates with the availability of 
lower-skilled female labour migrants (Jaumotte et al., 2016). For example, the availability of 
relatively low-cost workers in the services or health care sector may allow high-skilled women to 
enter the labour force or work longer hours, increasing productivity and their wages. 
However, where there are no complementarities, some studies find a negative impact on wages 
particularly for low-skilled workers (for US: Aydemir & Borjas, 2011; for UK: Dustmann et al, 
2013). Although not true in all circumstances, workers in low skilled occupations are expected to 
face more competition from migrants because the skills needed for those jobs are easier to 
acquire and are less specialised. In terms of employment, the extent to which declining wages in 
some sectors (due to an increase in the supply of low-skilled labour through international 
migrants) increase unemployment or inactivity among existing workers depends on their 
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willingness to accept the new lower wages and to move away to areas with less competition 
(Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2018).  
Studies for the UK are in line with these conclusions. For example: 
 Dustmann et al (2013) found positive effects for most workers in the UK, but negative 
effects for the lower paid; they found that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of 
migrants to non-migrants leads to a 0.6% decrease in wages for workers at the 5th 
earnings percentile and a 0.5% decrease at the 10th percentile.  
 The Bank of England (Nickell & Saleheen, 2015) concluded that a rise in immigration had 
a tiny impact on overall wages – with a 10% increase in immigration – wages fall by 
0.31%. However, the negative effect was greater for semi/unskilled workers in the service 
sector, with a 10% rise in immigration reducing wages the equivalent of 2%. The authors 
also concluded that there is no different impact between migrants from EU countries and 
non-EU countries.  
 Manacorda et al. (2012) suggested that any adverse wage effects of immigration are 
likely to be greatest for resident workers who are themselves migrants. This is because 
the skills of new migrants are likely to be closer substitutes for the skills of migrants 
already employed in the UK than for those of UK-born workers.  
The impacts of high-skilled vs low-skilled migrants 
Docquier et al. (2014) showed that immigration usually had a positive effect on the average 
wages of less educated workers in the 35 OECD countries: whether they assume an optimistic or 
a pessimistic scenario. According to them, this is due to higher education levels of the OECD 
immigrants relative to the non-migrant natives. Educated people are job-creating and 
complement less educated workers in productive activities. Hence, higher immigration leads 
to more job creation and higher demand for people further down the job ladder (Docquier et al., 
2014). Furthermore, they showed that less educated existing workers experienced 
particularly large wage and employment gains in countries whose immigration systems 
favour educated immigrants, like Australia and Canada. In other countries like Luxembourg, 
Ireland, the UK, and Switzerland, less educated natives gained between 2% and 5% in their 
wages (Docquier et al., 2014). 
Peri et al. (2014) showed for the US that highly educated immigrants have contributed to the 
growth of the total factor productivity (TFP), which has positive spillover effects on wages for 
existing workers. The authors find that foreign STEM workers can explain 30% to 60% of US 
TFP growth between 1990 and 2010. Foreign-born workers were responsible for 80% of the 
growth of college-educated STEM workers in total employment in the US. A rise in foreign STEM 
workers by one percentage point of total employment increases real wages of college-educated 
existing workers by 7–8 percentage points and those of non-college-educated existing workers 
by 3-4 percentage points (Peri et al., 2014). Other research also showed that international 
immigration changes the technology used for producing (providing) certain products (services). 
For example, the immigration of skilled workers may encourage innovation and the adoption of 
more skill intensive technologies, which would affect labour demand (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 
2018).  
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Labour market dynamics 
Although international migration could affect some existing lower income groups negatively (or in 
other cases less positively), in general the political debate on international migration overstates 
the supply side of the labour market and understates the demand side. International migration 
results in higher demands for specific services and goods, resulting in employers to 
increase production in some sectors, which could result in more employment (Alesina et 
al., 2015; Cattaneo et al., 2015). For instance, the immigration of low-skilled workers may expand 
the production of certain products and services that use low-skilled labour intensively. This 
expansion of a certain sector could as a result increase overall demand for labour and drive 
wages back up. During an economic downturn, however, labour demand may respond more 
slowly than during times of economic growth (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2018). 
Furthermore, employment rates for migrants are higher in countries with low entry-level wages 
and less employment protection (Ho & Shirono, 2015). As country-specific skills accumulate with 
time in residence, the probability of being employed gradually converges to that of otherwise 
comparable natives, but in most cases full convergence is not observed even after over 20 years 
(Ho & Turk-Ariss, 2018). The speed of employment integration varies substantially across 
migrants of different gender and country of origin, as well as across host countries 
(depending on skills, language, networks etc.). Moreover, poor macroeconomic or labour 
market conditions upon arrival tend to slow down integration, especially for female migrants (Ho 
& Turk-Ariss, 2018). 
The evidence, as mentioned above, suggests that one reason why the labour market impacts of 
migrant inflows vary from place to place is due to whether or not a country has flexible labour 
markets that allow them to adjust. Specifically, countries with the most rigid labour market 
institutions – rules that make it more costly to take on and lay off workers – saw the 
biggest rise in unemployment. “The choice to protect incumbent workers made it more difficult 
for unemployed natives to find new jobs where they could complement rather than compete with 
newcomers” (Clemens & Hunt, 2017). OECD et al. (2018) argues that governments must 
shoulder their responsibilities by offering support for the less-educated men in their own 
populations as well as helping migrants to integrate. 
Aiyar et al. (2016) found that migrants have lower participation, employment rates, and wages 
than natives in advanced economies. The earnings and employment gaps are pronounced in the 
initial years, but fall as migrants gain language proficiency and obtain more relevant job 
experience. Therefore, migrants from advanced economies or with better initial language skills 
often do better than other groups (IMF, 2016). Challenges for female migrants, low-skilled 
economic migrants from low-and-middle-income-countries and refugees seem to be 
particularly acute; their labour market outcomes are in the short term less advanced 
(Aldén & Hammarstedt, 2014). Policy on employment integration should implement diverse 
approaches to different migrants. 
Refugees and labour market impacts 
The above-mentioned outcomes are mainly from studies with a broad definition of international 
migration, defined as all the residents that were not born in the host country. No studies could be 
found that focus only on the labour effects of economic migrants from low-and-middle-income-
countries to advanced economies. However, some studies look to the impact of waves of 
refugees during specific periods of crisis. Clemens and Hunt (2017) concluded that the evidence 
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from refugee waves “reinforces the existing consensus that the impact of immigration on average 
native-born workers is small, and fails to substantiate claims of large detrimental impacts on 
workers with less than high school” (Clemens & Hunt, 2017: from abstract). For example, they 
showed that: 
 A sudden movement of over a million people from Algeria to France in 1962 raised the 
unemployment rate for low-skill French workers by about 0.2 percentage point.  
 The Balkan refugees across Europe in the 1990s also seem to have caused a small, 
short-term increase in native unemployment.  
 The arrival of 125,000 Cubans into Miami had no effect on unemployment and was 
followed by a small rise in average low-skill wages.  
 The movement of Soviet refugees into Israel in the early 1990s, enough to raise the 
country’s population 12% in just four years, saw a substantial rise in the wages of the 
occupations they crowded into. 
A study (Foged & Peri, 2015) on the impact of refugees in Denmark that used a national 
database that follows each individual over two decades, even as they change residences and 
jobs, found that refugees did initially displace small numbers of existing workers. However, the 
inflow of low-skilled migrants encouraged natives to upgrade their skills, taking 
advantage of immigrant-native complementarity to spur mobility and increase 
specialisation into more complex jobs, where they were more productive. The most 
affected natives typically ended up earning 3% more than they had before (Foged & Peri, 2015). 
However, there is also evidence that the arrival of large groups of international migrants creates 
informal markets, which provides low wages and job insecure work. For example, the arrival of 
almost 2 million working-age Syrians in Turkey has had a clear effect on the informal economy in 
the south-eastern cities where most have congregated (OECD et al., 2018). Women, young 
people and low-skilled workers in particular have been pushed out of employment 
through increased informal markets. There is also evidence that Italy’s large informal 
economy relates to the influx of international migrants, where many migrants work in 
construction, cleaning and domestic service (OECD et al., 2018). 
3. Impact on investment, trade and entrepreneurship 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Immigration and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are intimately related. Burchardi et al. (2017) 
using data on historical migrations to the US demonstrated a causal effect of the ancestry 
composition of US states on FDI sent and received by local firms. For the average US state, 
doubling the number of individuals with ancestry from a given origin country increases by 
4 percentage points the probability that at least one firm from that US state engages in FDI 
with that origin country. It also increases by 7% the number of local jobs at subsidiaries of 
firms headquartered in that origin country. These effects persist over generations and is primarily 
driven by a reduction in information frictions, suggesting that immigrants pass traits to their 
descendants that facilitate economic exchange with their origin countries, such as social ties to 
family and friends or knowledge of the origin country’s language and culture (Burchardi et al., 
2017). 
Theory suggests that common ancestry, next to reduction in information friction, may also have a 
positive impact on FDI because it: (i) induces similarities in tastes for consumption, (ii) causes a 
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convergence in factor endowments, facilitating horizontal FDI, or (iii) provides social collateral for 
contract enforcement, substituting for poor institutions. However, Burchardi et al., (2017) did not 
find evidence supporting these other channels. According to them, common ancestry does not 
affect FDI in the final goods sector more than in the intermediate goods sector, does not appear 
to cause a convergence in the sectoral distribution of employment, and has a significantly weaker 
impact on FDI for countries with weak institutions. Their findings are consistent with other 
evidence that information is transmitted internationally through networks created by common 
ancestry (Arkolakis, 2010; Chaney, 2014).  
Also consistent with other evidence, Burchardi et al. (2017) showed that the effect of ancestry on 
FDI is highly concave (as all the relevant information is gradually exhausted), weaker if many 
people from the same or neighbouring origins live in the surrounding area (as relevant 
information is more likely to have already percolated), and stronger for destinations that are more 
ethnically diverse (indicative of a hub-effect). Also consistent with this view, the effect of ancestry 
is stronger for more distant and ethnically diverse countries (where information is plausibly 
harder to acquire). Hence, Burchardi et al. (2017) concluded that FDI is found to follow the 
paths of historical migrants as much as it follows differences in productivity, tax rates, 
and education. 
The complexity and significance of the migrants’ network for FDI is also shown in other studies. 
For example, Garas et al. (2017) found that the networks of international migration and 
bilateral FDI are strongly and positively correlated. More interestingly, Garas et al. (2017) 
found for OECD countries that centrality in the international migration network boosts bilateral 
FDI between any two countries. Hence, they conclude that bilateral FDI between any two 
countries is not only affected by the presence of migrants from either countries, but also by the 
number of their total inward-migration links (connectivity in the international migration network). 
Garas et al. (2017) suggest that this indirect network effect may be driven by learning processes 
of new investment preferences by immigrants from ‘third party’ origins. Other studies show the 
same outcome: more immigrants coming from ‘third party’ origins may imply more openness and 
foster learning processes about investment patterns and therefore stimulate more bilateral capital 
exchanges (Fagiolo & Mastrorillo, 2014). 
Refugees and FDI: 
Mayda (2017) examined the impact of refugees in the US after resettlement on FDI. She 
concluded that a 10% increase in the number of refugees initially placed in a given commuting 
zone within the US increases FDI from their country of origin by 0.19%. Refugees often keep 
close ties with family and friends in their countries of origin. Therefore, they can stimulate FDI 
inflows by providing information on local (US) business opportunities in a given location. 
In addition, refugees can help overcome problems of imperfect contract enforcement – not all 
aspects of business interactions can be regulated by a contract, in which case tight communities 
such as refugees’ networks provide an informal way to monitor business interactions and reduce 
risks (Mayda, 2017).  
Finally, refugees themselves can bring financial assets to the US (either their own or 
friends’ and relatives’) and use them to invest in the country. For example, entrepreneurial 
refugees may take their business with them when they leave their origin country. The role of 
foreign capital to fund these businesses is also noted by a report for the US Small Business 
Administration (Fairlie, 2012). It highlighted that: “The most common source of start-up capital for 
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immigrant-owned businesses is personal or family savings with roughly two-thirds of businesses 
reporting this source of start-up capital” (Fairlie, 2012). Migrants and refugees are also more 
likely to finance their businesses with business investment from family/friends, which may be 
located in their home country.  
Lemmon (2017) showed for Turkey that 28.8% of foreign-partnered companies were founded 
directly by Syrian people or Syrian nationals in partnerships. There were differences by gender 
for Syrian women launching small-scale food businesses, and Syrian men moving their larger 
enterprises from home (Lemmon, 2017). Similarly, Yoshioka (2017) concludes that in Turkey 
“over the past five years Syrian refugees have set up over 4,000 businesses, bringing with them 
US$220m in capital and making up over a quarter of all new foreign-owned firms established 
annually.” 
International trade 
Genç (2014) gives an overview of the evidence of 48 studies that link international trade with 
international migration. He concluded that there is a causal positive relationship between 
migration and international trade. A 10% increase in the stock of immigrants can boost trade 
by an estimated 1.5% on average.2 Almost no studies have found a negative impact. Similarly to 
FDI, immigrants can lower the transaction costs for trade because of their superior 
knowledge of home country markets, language, customs, business practices, and laws. 
Furthermore, transaction cost effects are expected to affect both exports and imports and a 
common feature of the studies is that they all implicitly assume that immigration affects trade, not 
the other way around (Genç, 2014).  
This direct trade-stimulating impact is likely to be greatest when the host and home countries 
have very different cultures, languages, and institutions, and when alternative sources of 
information are lacking, for example as informal trade barriers become more significant. 
Immigrants may lower such frictions through their knowledge of their home country's language, 
regulations, market opportunities, and informal institutions. Immigrants can decrease the costs of 
negotiating and enforcing contracts by drawing upon their trusted networks, thereby deterring 
opportunistic behaviour in weak institutional environments. Migrants are thus typically 
expected to facilitate bilateral trade mostly with developing countries, where firms 
typically need to navigate a myriad of bureaucratic and legal hurdles. Parsons (2012) 
showed this by dividing the world into the relatively affluent North and poorer South, the data 
shows that migrants affect significantly Northern exports to the South. Parsons (2012) explains 
this that:  
 In general countries of the North export more differentiated products, while countries of 
the South more often export homogenous commodities;  
 Informational barriers are likely highest in trade between those regions (Parsons, 2012).  
                                                   
2 Genç (2014) found that for all the different cases he found in the literature, the overall mean of the immigration elasticity of 
exports was found to be 0.17, with that of imports very close to it at 0.16. This means international migration increases a bit 
more the export than import for a host country. Recent data with better and more immigration data than past studies yield 
similar results (Genç, 2014). 
10 
However, Genç (2014) concluded that there is no convincing evidence that the impact of 
immigrants on trade is greater for trade with developing countries than for trade with countries 
general.  
Some studies suggest that the trade-inducing effect of immigrants is particularly strong when the 
first migrants from a particular origin country arrive and that the impact becomes smaller once 
a sizable migrant community has been established (Genç et al., 2013). For imports into the 
host country this can be explained with the immigrant preference effects, which are expected to 
boost only imports to the host country because they arise through the consumption channel as a 
result of immigrants’ demand for the products from their home countries. It is also possible that 
demand for such goods increases among the host population as well, through a demonstration 
effect influencing the preferences of native-born residents. Over time, however, a countervailing 
immigrant substitution effect might also occur if the number of immigrants is high enough for 
domestic firms to start producing those products (Parsons, 2012).  
Even after controlling for other factors, there are differences between countries in the immigrant 
elasticities of imports and exports. Differences in immigration and trade policies of host countries 
may cause this variation, like (Genç, 2014):  
 The trade facilitation effect of immigrants is lower for homogeneous goods, for which the 
immigrant preference effect is expected to be less.  
 There is some evidence that inclusion of the income per capita variable in the model 
increases the estimated impact of immigration on imports.  
 A distance variable is found to do the same for exports.  
 The use of variables that account for geography (such as whether countries are 
landlocked or remote) removes some of the effect of migration on trade.  
 A trade agreements variable reduces the immigrant elasticity of imports but not that of 
exports significantly.  
 Accounting for migrants’ duration of residence or home country generally makes no 
difference.  
A related, but indirect link may also exist. Ethnic minorities living outside their home 
countries create formal and informal networks to which both the host country and home 
country have access. These co-ethnic networks may promote trade by providing market 
information and supporting contractual enforcement. This network effect is in particular a strong 
mechanism to overcome informal international trade barriers. A study of Germany’s trade found 
that the most efficient migrant networks originate from African or Middle-Eastern countries rather 
than from EU countries (Behncke, 2014). This is consistent with the view that the presence of 
migrant business networks is less relevant when countries already have commonalities. 
Parsons and Vézina (2014) showed in a case study how this has worked for the Vietnamese 
immigrants to the US. Following the lifting of trade sanctions with Vietnam in 1994, the share of 
US exports going to Vietnam was higher and more diversified in the states with larger 
Vietnamese populations. They found that states with larger Vietnamese populations, measured 
in either levels or as shares of state populations, total migrant stocks or Asian migrant stocks, are 
associated with greater exports to Vietnam, whether expressed as shares of state GDP or total 
exports, or as the share of industries with positive exports, i.e. the extensive margin. The results 
are robust to controlling for income per capita, remoteness from US customs ports, and export 
structure, suggest that a 10% increase in the Vietnamese network raises the ratio of exports to 
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Vietnam over GDP by 2%, and the share of total exports going to Vietnam by 1.5% (Parsons & 
Vézina, 2014).  
Firm-level data for Portugal shows that larger stocks of emigrants increase the likelihood of 
exports within the firm. If a firm serves a market, the presence of emigration stocks is an 
important driver of how much it sells there (Bastos & Silva, 2012)). Data from Denmark for 1995–
2005 shows a robust positive impact of the employment of foreigners on export sales. At least 
1.2% higher export sales could be found per additional immigrant employee (Hiller, 2013).  
Parsons (2012) mentioned that an international examination of the trade-migration nexus at the 
product level is absent from the existing literature, which is needed fully understand the 
mechanisms underpinning the trade-migration nexus. 
Trade in services:  
Most research focuses on trade in goods and the link between immigrants and trade in services 
is almost unexplored. However, Ottoviano et al. (2015) stated that “due to the customer-specific 
information required for the provision of services this link may be particularly important”.3 
Ottoviano et al. (2015) used data from the UK that showed the dominant role of business 
services and royalties and licensing agreements in both imports and exports. These are services 
that require a significant amount of country-specific and institution-specific knowledge. 
Consistent with the conclusions on the link between immigration and FDI and trade in goods, 
Ottoviano et al. (2015) found that these effects are stronger when the trading partners are more 
culturally and institutionally dissimilar. They conclude that relative to trade in goods the 
transaction cost reduction that occurs through immigration may be particularly important 
for trade in services, since providing a service abroad often requires an understanding of 
cultural specificities that goes well beyond what is required when selling a physical good abroad.  
At the same time, Ottaviano et al. (2013) concluded that immigrants reduce imports of 
intermediate services as they substitute for work that is otherwise performed by workers 
in their home country and then imported. In other words, domestic firms may be faced with 
the decision to hire a local immigrant worker from a particular country or, instead, to ‘offshore’ 
that work to foreign workers in that country and import the finished product.  
Ottaviano et al. (2015) found that for the UK a one percentage point increase in immigrants from 
a particular country into a local labour market leads firms in that area to export 6% to 10% more 
services to that country (a bilateral effect). They found that this effect is driven primarily by 
export growth among firms already serving the market rather than by new firms entering 
the market. Furthermore, this effect is strongest for services that are intensive in the use of 
language and legal expertise while it is not significant for the export of technical services. These 
findings are consistent with the view that for services in which the cultural content plays an 
important role, immigrants are an effective channel of services-trade creation.  
Parsons and Vézina (2014) also showed that many Vietnamese businesses provided information 
and business services to US multinationals wishing to do business in Vietnam and help them 
navigate through a multitude of legal hurdles. For example, the first companies that established 
                                                   
3 Cited from Ottoviano et al. article on the VOX website (June 2015): https://voxeu.org/article/immigration-trade-and-
productivity-services 
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long-distance telephone and flight services to Vietnam after 1994, drastically reducing 
information barriers between the two countries, were founded by Vietnamese migrants. 
Entrepreneurship 
There is a perception that international migrants are more entrepreneurial than the native 
population. Proponents of this view mainly point to the successes of migrant entrepreneurs in 
China and the US. For example, in China, 25% of immigrants are self-employed and involved in 
trade with their country of origin (Giulietti et al. 2012). In the US, longitudinal data shows that 
approximately 25% of US entrepreneurs (defined as the top initial earners in a new business) are 
immigrants to the US (Pekkala Kerr & Kerr, 2016). In total, between 35% and 40% of new US 
firms have at least one immigrant entrepreneur connected to the firm’s creation (Pekkala Kerr & 
Kerr, 2016). Data from start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) firms and entrepreneurs seeking 
high-growth opportunities showed that immigrant entrepreneurship is somewhat stronger for VC-
backed firms, with 31% of VC-backed founders being immigrants (Pekkala Kerr & Kerr, 2016). 
Furthermore, immigrant founders launch firms that are smaller than native-founded firms 
(average employment in firms founded exclusively by immigrants is 4.4 workers, compared to 7.0 
workers for firms launched exclusively by natives). However, when the founders are mixed, the 
average is significantly higher with 16.9 workers (Pekkala Kerr & Kerr, 2016).   
The main argument in the literature on migrants and entrepreneurship is, that migrant 
entrepreneurs may be less risk averse (Neville et al. 2014), be more able to spot opportunities for 
new businesses (Hart & Acs, 2011), have access to supplementary sources of support, training 
and financing - as often migrants increase their educational level and/or gain new skills, save 
more money and extend their social network while living abroad (de Haas, 2006; OECD, 2008). 
However, as Naudé et al. (2017) show the empirical evidence is not strong. Most standard 
government sources that are publicly accessible can only tell something about immigrant self-
employment, which leaves a big question mark around job creation and economic growth. For 
instance, an OECD (2010) review finds that migrant entrepreneurship, measured by self-
employment rates, is more common than non-migrant entrepreneurship in only 13 out of 25 
countries in the OECD.  
Moreover, in the countries with larger immigrant populations, such as Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Switzerland and The Netherlands, migrants are much less likely than natives to be 
self-employed (OECD, 2010). The only study to compare start-up rates (early entrepreneurial 
activity) amongst migrants and non-migrants across countries is the 2012 Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). It finds that rates of early entrepreneurial activity (start-up 
rates) are similar between migrants and non-migrants and that start-up rates of migrants are just 
as heterogeneous across countries as that of non-migrants (Vorderwülbecke, 2012).  
Based on existing evidence, it does not seem like migrant entrepreneurs face significant other 
challenges than non-migrants - apart from discrimination, which is a significant factor (Nauré et 
al., 2018). Migrants often face discrimination in formal labour markets, which then drives them 
into (necessity) self-employment. Rising xenophobia has been found to push disproportionate 
numbers of migrants with limited English proficiency into self-employment in the USA (Mora & 
Davila, 2007).  
That discrimination and xenophobia foster self-employment amongst migrants is thus 
acknowledged (Nauré et al., 2018). When they have a choice, migrants may often prefer wage 
employment to being self-employed. This conclusion is supported by the empirical patterns of 
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migrant self-employment in the OECD (OECD, 2010) as well as studies from, e.g., Germany 
which find that it is more likely for less educated migrants to be self-employed than for higher 
educated migrants (Constant & Zimmermann, 2006). As a result, migrant entrepreneurs may 
be very vulnerable to external shocks because they are often in entrepreneurship due to a 
lack in access to wage employment (Brixy et al., 2013). Neville et al (2014) findings that 
migrant entrepreneurs often perform worse than non-migrants, suggest they indeed face more 
difficulties. Using performance measures such as sales growth and profits from new Canadian 
start-ups, Neville et al. (2014) find that migrant enterprises are not generally better performing 
than those of non-migrants and that very often immigrant-owned firms underperformed. Only in 
the case of migrant firms that export do they find superior performance, suggesting that 
these migrant firms may have better international networks (this is in line of what was written 
above).  
A number of countries have launches schemes to attract immigrant entrepreneurs as a way to 
further economic growth. For example, Chile’s Start-Up Chile programme pays overseas 
entrepreneurs to come visit for six months as a way to build global bridges and foster an 
entrepreneurial culture at home. A 2016 EU conference examined existing initiatives to stimulate 
migrant entrepreneurship and the added value of potential European level actions.4 It highlighted 
that effective and targeted business support schemes have an important role to play in 
supporting migrant entrepreneurs. This was followed by the Commission starting four specific 
capacity building projects for migrant entrepreneurs in 2017.5 
4. Impact on productive sectors, innovation and GDP 
growth 
High-skilled vs low-skilled migrants 
The macro-economic relevance of international migration is measured as the changes in output 
per capita in host countries (GDP growth per capita). Evidence suggests that migration could 
indeed have a positive impact on output per capita in host countries. However, such 
analysis is complicated by the fact that some of the pull factors driving migration can bias the 
findings — for example, if migrants settle in countries experiencing high GDP growth, it would be 
easy to conclude that migration is “causing” that growth (IMF, 2016). To circumvent this 
complication, Alesina et al. (2015) and Ortega and Peri (2014) use a gravity model to disentangle 
the effects of migration driven by push factors. In a cross-sectional setting, they find a large 
positive impact of migrants on output per capita in recipient countries. They relate this to a 
positive impact on employment, capital accumulation, and labour productivity from mainly high-
skilled international migrants, which not only increases productivity on its own, but also fosters 
diversity in the labour force.  
Manole et al. (2017) argued that for the receiving countries, migration results in higher 
productivity through innovation and complementarities, leading to economic growth. The 
study showed that an increase in the number of migrants by 100,000 leads to a 0.84% increase 
in the GDP per capita of the receiving country. Noja et al. (2018) came to the same conclusion 
                                                   
4 See for more information: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/we-work-for/migrants_en 
5 See for more information: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/we-work-for/migrants_en 
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for EU countries, but added that although there is a difference between asylum seekers/refugees 
and economic immigrants, the first also tend to generate positive effects upon the labour market 
slightly increasing the employment rate and labour productivity. 
Jaumotte et al. (2016) estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants in the 
working-age population can raise GDP per capita over the long term by up to 2%. This result is 
economically significant. They find that migration has a positive and significant impact on labour 
productivity. In addition, they find no relationship between the long-term growth in the capital-to-
labour ratio and the change in the stock of migrants, consistent with investment adjusting over 
time to a larger pool of potential workers. Moreover, migration has a positive effect on the 
incomes of both the top earners and of those of the rest of the population, although the 
impact of high-skilled migrants is larger for top earners.  
According to estimates from the IMF, by the end of 2017 GDP in Austria, Germany and Sweden - 
three countries which have received large numbers of refugees per capita - will have been 
boosted by 0.5%, 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively (Aiyar et al., 2016). In Germany, by far the largest 
recipient in absolute terms, refugee-related expenditure amounted to more than EUR 20 billion in 
2017 (Aiyar et al., 2016). In other words, aggregate demand in the short-term has a positive 
impact on GDP growth. Aiyar et al. (2016) are more cautious about the long-term effects. 
Effects depend on: migrants’ average level of education; how long they will remain in their host 
countries; and, most importantly the long-term economic impact of refugees rests largely on how 
successful countries are at economically integrating migrants. The more refugees who find 
jobs, and the better paid these jobs are, the greater the positive impact on labour supply 
and economic growth.  
The literature shows that both high- and low-skilled migrants increase productivity. However, 
high-skilled migrants are more likely to have a larger impact on GDP per capita through 
their larger impact on productivity. According to the literature, lower-skilled migrants may also 
increase productivity if their skills are complementary to those of natives. Jaumotte et al. (2016) 
found that both high- and low-skilled migrants have a positive impact on productivity of a similar 
magnitude. They attribute this finding to the “over-qualification of migrants”, as some countries 
show a higher proportion of highly educated migrants employed in lower-skill occupations, which 
add to the complementarities. Low-skilled migrant workers allow higher-skilled natives to move 
into different labour market segments, encouraging them to take higher-skill jobs and obtain 
additional education. They also promote female labour force participation by taking 
housekeeping and childcare jobs. However, a large entry of low-skilled immigrants could 
change the sectoral specialisation of the economy, for instance toward lower-productivity 
sectors such as construction, lowering Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (IMF, 2016). 
Productive and innovative sectors 
Van de Beek (2010) is more critical for the Dutch context, as he showed that in the 1960s and 
1970s jobs for economic migrants were concentrated in low productive sectors. In the medium 
term, this had an overall opposite effect on the economy. These industries could only compete 
internationally by keeping the wages low, but during the transition years towards more capital-
intensive sectors in the 1980s it were mainly the migrants who lost their jobs. The lack of 
integration efforts and policies combined with a non-flexible labour market, the majority of these 
migrants fell back to social security programmes (Van Beek, 2010). Nagamura’s (2010) study of 
Japan supports these points, outlining how international migrants working in less productive 
sectors can be a cushion for necessary rapid economic transformation. However, he showed that 
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a combination of immigrants and native Japanese in low productivity sectors, rather than 
only focussing on cheap migrant labour, could increase survival probability to make 
production operations more efficient. 
In this context, innovation is an important factor for any conclusion on international migration and 
economic growth. Migration can contribute to innovation and migrants can benefit economically 
from innovation. For example, immigrants may foster services trade to all destinations by 
increasing the overall productivity of the firm, thereby increasing the profits associated with 
overseas sales (Wright, 2014). Potential sources of these productivity gains are a ‘diversity 
effect’ in which immigrants foster creativity and help generate new ideas, and a ‘specialization 
effect’, in which immigrants possess a comparative advantage in performing certain production 
tasks, allowing for greater division of labour within the firm. When these productivity gains are 
large enough and firms face fixed barriers to exporting, the gains may help firms to 
overcome these barriers and access foreign markets they might not otherwise serve 
(Ottaviano et al., 2015). 
Most of the literature focusses on the impact of high-skilled migrants and their impact on 
innovation and GDP growth. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), using US patent data, find that 
“immigrants account for 24 [per cent] of patents, twice their share in the population, and that the 
skilled immigrant patenting advantage over natives is entirely accounted for by immigrants’ 
disproportionately holding degrees in science and engineering fields” (Hunt and Gauthier-
Loiselle, 2010, p.33).  
5. Impact on government spending and tax revenues 
Revenues from migrants include taxes they pay directly such as income tax, social insurances, 
and VAT on purchases. Expenditures include direct costs such as public health care, education 
for migrants’ children and cash benefits such as tax credits and pensions, and government 
spending that is likely to be affected by the size of the population such as transport and policing. 
Given their impact on the working-age population and economic activity, migrants can 
generate additional tax revenues and social contributions (Vargas-Silva & Sumption, 2019). 
However, especially in the case of refugees, time is an important factor, which means there will 
be a delay before they begin making a fiscal contribution (IMF, 2016). In the short term, they 
may need recourse to welfare services and claim social benefits - notably, health care and 
social assistance. In case of a short-term negative effect on employment and wages, although 
the literature suggests that this is not often the case (see above), social costs could temporarily 
increase. However, these effects could also be mitigated if migration increases the income from 
capital (e.g. through higher house prices – see box 1) for natives (IMF, 2016).  
The impact of migration on fiscal accounts depends not only on migrants’ income, but 
also on the generosity of the social security system in host economies and the flexibility 
of the labour market to adjust to changes, which are two important factors of how fast 
immigrants can integrate in the labour market (Vargas-Silva & Sumption, 2019). Over their 
lifetime, migrants tend to contribute less than natives to the fiscal accounts, mainly because they 
pay less in taxes and social security payments (IMF, 2016). This points to the importance of their 
integration into labour markets: their smaller contributions reflect less time in the labour force and 
in general lower-paying jobs. This also explains the rationale of labour migration management 
systems. In the Australian system, for example, age has a strong weight - up to 38% of the pass 
mark - and there are maximum-age thresholds for admission (IMF, 2016).  
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Migrants depend more on some social transfers, but differences between them and natives do 
not seem to have large budgetary implications. Relative to unemployed native-borns, 
unemployed migrants are more likely to receive social assistance, but less likely to receive more 
generous unemployment benefits. The case of Germany illustrates that both natives and 
migrants have an increasing contribution as they approach working age, which diminishes during 
retirement - the contribution of migrants, though, tends to become positive later, peak at a lower 
level, and turn negative at an earlier stage (IMF, 2016). Furlanetto & Robstad (2016) show in 
case of Norway with its generous social security programmes that the burden that 
immigrants may place on public finances over the long-term is neutral. They found that a 
positive immigration shock lowered public expenditure in the short run, but increased it in the 
long run, perhaps reflecting family reunifications. Because fiscal revenues also increased the net 
effect on public finances was slightly positive in the short run, and neutral in the long run. 
Experience, suggests that the net fiscal impact of migrants is small for OECD countries. 
Estimates depend critically on a number of assumptions - notably the many elements that 
determine the employment prospects of migrants (as noted above), their age profile, and how the 
analytical approach takes into account the dynamic macroeconomic effects of migration (Vargas-
Silva & Sumption, 2019). OECD (2013) presents a cross-country study based on a static 
accounting (cash flow) model that assesses the tax and social security contributions as well as 
the receipt of social security benefits and government services of the stock of migrants in 27 
OECD countries between 2007 and 2009. The impact, either positive or negative, rarely exceeds 
0.5 percent of GDP in a given year and is about zero on average. There is a positive fiscal 
impact in 19 countries—that is, 70% of the sample of countries.  
In case of refugees, higher short-term costs of caring for refugees, however, could add 
fiscal pressure in recipient economies. On arrival, refugees receive housing, subsistence, and 
integration support. Moreover, they are often not allowed to work until their legal status is 
cleared. This lowers their short-term fiscal contribution relative to that of other migrants and 
natives (IMF, 2016). Less developed countries have typically shouldered the largest burden 
associated with refugees - for instance, in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, spending on refugees is 
estimated at 2.4%, 3.2%, and 1.3% of GDP, respectively, during the recent surge (for Jordan: 
IMF, 2015a; for Lebanon: IMF, 2015b; for Turkey: IMF, 2016). This is also relevant for many 
European countries, which have relatively generous welfare systems and a significant number of 
humanitarian migrants. Aiyar et al. (2016) estimated for the euro area suggest that average 
budgetary expenditures on refugees could reach 0.2% of GDP in 2016, with Austria, Finland, 
Germany, and Sweden expected to shoulder the largest spending increases. For Sweden, 
expenditure on migration is expected to be 1% of GDP in 2016.  
For the UK, all studies (Rowthorn, 2014; Dustmann & Frattini, 2014) come to similar conclusions 
that there is a difference between the contributions made by migrants from the original EU-
member-states, the newer EU-member-states, and non-EEA migrants. Studies examining the 
fiscal impact of migrants have produced different results, although in all cases, the impacts have 
been estimated at less than +/- 1% of GDP. However, there is consistency in the results, as they 
conclude that the fiscal impact of EEA migrants is more positive than that of non-EEA 
migrants; and that the impact of recent migrants is more positive than the impact of migrants 
overall. For example, a study by Oxford Economics (2018), commissioned by the Migration 
Advisory Committee, estimated the net fiscal contribution of EEA migrants in fiscal year 2016/17 
at £4.7bn, compared to a net cost of £9bn for non-EEA migrants. Migration Watch (2016) found 
that in fiscal year 2014/15 both EEA and non-EEA migrants represented a net fiscal cost (of 
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£1.2bn and £15.6bn respectively). A large part of difference between these studies arises from 
the choice of how much of the taxes paid by businesses attribute to migrants (Vargas-Silva & 
Sumption, 2019).  
Oxford Economics (2018) found that the negative net fiscal contribution of non-EEA migrants 
was primarily due to higher spending on education of children, since non-EEA migrants are 
currently more likely to have dependent children than the UK-born. They were also estimated to 
receive more in family benefits and tax credits. Oxford Economics (2018) found that a single 20-
year old with no children only needed to earn just over £10,000 per year in order to ‘break even’ 
from a fiscal perspective, while a couple with two dependent children—who incur much greater 
expenditure on health and education—would not become net fiscal contributors until they earned 
around £45,000. 
However, over the longer term, migration has the potential to reduce fiscal pressure 
related to population aging in recipient countries. For example, continued migration in line 
with current trends could slow the expected increase in the old-age dependency ratio and 
associated health care and pension spending relative to GDP (Clements et al., 2015). These 
effects will be larger, the larger the impact of migration on GDP growth. Migration cannot fully 
address challenges from population aging, but it can provide time to phase in entitlement and 
other reforms, which are still necessary in many countries. Incoming migrants are more likely to 
be of working age than the population in general and therefore more likely to be working and 
contributing to public finances. OBR (2013) noted that over a longer time horizon than 50 years, 
these migrants would retire and add to age-related spending pressures. It concluded that “higher 
migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather 
than a way of resolving them permanently”. 
Box 1: Impact of international migration on housing in host countries 
The effect of international migration is not the largest contributor to house price dynamics; however, it is significant. A study 
(Barbu et al., 2017) using data for the period 2007-2014 for 21 countries showed the existence of a positive relationship 
between the evolution of the housing price and the flow of immigrants. An increase of the immigration flow of 1% (measured by 
the percentage change in the number of immigrants) lead to an increase of the housing price (measured by the HPI index), with 
approximately 0.045%. One explanation for this evolution is given by the increasing demand for real estate assets generated by 
the immigrants (even for living, as owned property, but, even more, for rented properties). Increasing demand on the real estate 
market (by increasing rents) and changing its structure lead to rising real estate prices. At the same time, establishing a 
distinction between volunteer and involuntary immigrants would better highlight the effects of immigration on the price housing 
(Barbu et al., 2017). 
UK: The UK Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology (2017) states that about 80% of foreign-born migrants resident in 
the UK for less than five years live in the private rented sector, compared to about 20% of the UK-born population. Migrants 
with over a decade of residence tend to demonstrate similar levels of owner-occupation to the UK-born population. About 20% 
of migrants live in social rented accommodation, similar to the UK-born population. There is no evidence that social housing 
allocation favours migrants. However, shortages of suitable housing for all groups can exacerbate tensions between 
established residents and new migrants and hinder integration and community cohesion (Parliamentary Office of Science & 
Technology, 2017). In the case of Great Britain, the origin country and the financial condition of the immigrants may impact, in 
different ways, the housing price. Sá (2015) examines the housing price in Great Britain in the 159 territorial units from England 
and Wales, for 2003-2010. The derived conclusion is that the immigration has a negative effect on the housing price, caused by 
the mobility of British native people, who, when native villages are populated by immigrants, prefer to move elsewhere. These 
moves will result in a decrease in demand for homes in these areas, which will lead to lower price.  
 
US: In the US, housing immigrants accounted for 27.5% of the increase in the number of houses from 1994 up to date (White, 
2015). Cvijanovic et al. (2010) conclude that the immigrant population continues to be a key element in the US housing market, 
because their appetite to buy their own homes in the US is high. Vigdor et al. (2013) had estimated the impact of immigration 
on the housing price in dollars and cents, using data on population and mortgage market for the period 1970-2010. The results 
indicate that every immigrant added 11.6 cents to the housing price, leading in the US states with a high density of population 
to an increase in the housing value during a 40-year time interval. Saiz and Wachter (2011) estimated the impact of immigration 
on the native population dynamics and neighbouring residential areas. The authors argue that if the native population show a 
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negative attitude towards immigrants, they will prefer to relocate. The effects will be found both on the housing market in the 
areas where natives relocate and on the housing markets in areas where natives moved out.  
 
New Zealand: Based on historical data on immigration, McDonald (2013) developed a model to estimate the immigration 
correlation with different variables, among them the house price: 1000 arrivals of immigrants from Europe and the UK, housing 
price increased by 8% after two years, while if people come from Asia, the price increase is only 6%. Chanpiwal (2013) 
examines the response of New Zealand mortgage market to the shocks generated by immigrants. The study is based on data 
from the period 1996-2011 and show a positive correlation between migration and housing price, meaning that an increase with 
1% in the number of immigrants leads to a price increase on average by 7.5%. 
 
Norway: Nordbɸ (2013) and Frostad (2014) estimate the housing price elasticity in the case of an increase in the immigrant 
population share of 1% in the total population in Norway. The results are similar, indicating, based on the observations during 
the period 1986-2012, that the housing price increased by 2.6% to 3.3%, according to the first author, and by 2.95% according 
to the second author. Furlanetto and Robstad (2016) investigated systematically and in a consistent framework data for 
Norway, the impact of immigration on standard variables such as unemployment, housing price, public finances, exchange rate, 
labour productivity. By considering in a VAR model the housing price as unrestricted variable, the authors concluded that 
shocks induced by immigrant flows have no impact on housing price, as they are routed through labour supply channel.  
 
Spain: The empirical study conducted by Gonzalez and Ortega (2009) on the Spanish case highlights the effects of 
immigration on the housing price and residential development in 1998-2008. This country is a relevant case because the period 
corresponds to both real estate boom, and to the wave of immigration. On average, in the selected period, Spain received flows 
of immigrants equal to 17% of the working population, which led, on the one hand, to the rising housing price on average by 
52% and, on the other hand, it resulted in 37% of the new construction. 
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